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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions 
of Article VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Utah Constitution 
and pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Plaintiff appeals from the Third 
Judicial District Court's entry of Judgments in favor of 
Respondents. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES. 
Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953 
Rule 11 of U.R.C.P. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err when it entered sanction 
judgments against appellant Jeschke for $10,000.00 and his 
intervenor counsel appellant for 82,000.00 based on Sec. 
78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953 and Rule 11, U.R.C.P., respectively? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
On October 14, 1985 Flint Jeschke was injured in a 
rear-end collision in which David T. Willis was the driver 
of the other vehicle, a school bus. Jeschke brought suit 
for personal injuries and other claims. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The case was tried to a jury on November 9, 10, 
and 14, 1988. The jury returned a special verdict of 
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negligence but no causation and the trial court entered a 
judgment thereon of "no cause of action." The trial judge 
suggested that counsel for defendants file a motion for 
sanctions under Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. (R 510, P. 301). Such 
a motion was filed against Jeschke (R. 370). That same 
motion included santions against counsel for Jeschke based 
on Rule 11 (R. 370). 
C. Statement of Facts 
On October 14, 1985 Flint Jeschke was injured in a 
rear-end collision in which David T. Willis was the driver 
of the other vehicle, a school bus. Jeschke brought suit 
for personal injuries and other claims. Said suit was 
filed on the 9th day of June, 1987. 
By letter dated August 3, 1988, Mr. Ogilvie, 
counsel for David T. Willis and Granite School District 
advised Jeschke1s counsel that said plaintiff's claims were 
"probably fraudulent" (R. 381). 
Hansen then called Mr. Ogilvie and made an 
appointment to meet with him on August 9, 1988 (R. 392, 
Para. 2). Hansen wrote Jeschke a letter dated August 10, 
1988 to advise him he'd probably have to withdraw for moral 
reasons "unless you can miraculously give me a reasonable 
explanation" (Id., Para. 3). 
Jeschke responded by phone to that letter and 
admitted that the prior vehicle damage had occurred but 
there was additional damage in the second accident and that 
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could be proved easily because the property damage in the 
first accident amounted to under $300.00 and the second was 
over $900.00 and both bids for repair costs came from same 
repair shop (R. 393, Para. 4). He also explained he 
thought the deposition question concerning the prior 
accident was whether tve had been in a prior accident with 
the same truck and that in the first accident the truck was 
parked when it was hit and he was not in it (Id., R. 408). 
In said phone call Jeschke said he had not been injured in 
a dirt bike accident, that he had only two treatments for 
his lower back which bothered him after he was riding a 
dirt bike with his wife and friends and that those 
individuals could verify that there had been no accident 
(Id., Para. 5). Jeschke also said that Dr. Peterson and 
not Dr. Burns had treated him for the injuries caused by 
riding the dirt bike (Id.). 
Concerning the 1983 accident, Jeschke told Hansen 
that he did not believe that he had as many treatments as 
indicated in Hansenfs letter but there was no question that 
it was a serious and major accident (Id., Para. fS) . 
Between the letter and phone call last referred 
to, Hansen discussed the question of his ethical right and 
duty to withdraw from the case with an attorney who had 
considerable experience with a firm specializing in 
litigation and was advised that he must withdraw if the 
client stated his intention to deny the facts the attorney 
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knew to be true but if the client acknowledged the truth 
and asked only for damages resulting from the aggravation 
that there was no ethical problem in his opinion (Id., 
Para. 7) . 
On September 24, 1988 Jeschke made certain 
corrections to his deposition and swore to them before 
Hansen (R. 408). 
On September 26, 1988, Hansen sent Jeschke a draft 
of his proposed opening statement (R. 409-412) which said 
inter alia 
"The truck had been in a prior 
accident involving its rear end. That 
accident occurred about 3 months prior 
to the one this case is all about. At 
that time Flint, the plaintiff, was not 
in the truck. It was a hit and run 
case; his own insurance company paid 
about S300.00 for the damages. He had 
the bumper repaired but not the damages 
to the rear end itself. This will be a 
focal point of the case as it involves 
the severity of the impact.11 
Hansen's opening statement contained disclosures 
generally consistent with his planned opening (R. 508, P. 
10, 11) . 
Hansen's opening statement also disclosed the 
prior truck accident Jeschke had in 1983 and the dirt bike 
incident (Id.) . 
Hansen's closing statement acknowledged the prior 
truck damage (R. 510, P. 271). 
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Hansen spent approximately five hours on September 
26 and September 27, 1988 at the Attorney General's office 
reading Dr. Burns deposition of over seven hours (R. 392, 
para.. ) . 
On September 28, 1988, Hansen filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal (Judge Young being out of town or unavailable to 
hear a motion on the subject) (R. 394, Para. 14). 
On September 29, 1988, Hansen was advised by Judge 
Young's clerk that Jeschke must be prepared to go to trial 
with or without an attorney on October 4, 1988, and that 
the judge was unlikely to permit a withdrawal so close to 
the trial date. Hansen so advised Jeschke of the 
conversation with the said clerk (Id., Para. 16). 
In the afternoon of October 3, 1988, Hansen went 
to Mr. Ogilvie's office with Jeschke!s proposed jury 
instructions and learned for the first time that the 
defense was not prepared to go forward (Id., Para. 17). 
In a lengthy on the record discussion with the 
Court on October 4, 1988, Hansen explained that his reasons 
for withdrawal were primarily economic (to some extent due 
to the fact that Brad Nalder, the key witness regarding the 
dirt bike matter had not responded to his September 24, 
1988 speed note) and the Court said he could only allow 
withdrawal for moral reasons at that point (Id., Para. 18). 
Jeschke and Hansen believed then and believe now 
that Jeschke did sustain some injuries in this accident 
(Id. , Para. 19, R. 403, 404). 
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Thomas Soderberg, M.D. and Brian Burns, D.C. 
testified in depositions before trial and also at trial 
that while there is a general correlation between severity 
of impact and injuries sustained that there are many 
exceptions to that correlation and that in their opinion 
the injuries in question were caused by this accident, 
although they had no specific information regarding its 
severity (Id., Para. 20). 
Reed Fogg, M.D., defendants1 expert, testified at 
trial that in his opinion plaintiff suffered minimal 
injuries as a result of the subject accident (R. 509, P. 
239-242). He equated the pain to a sprained ankle and 
testified the injury should not bother plaintiff beyond two 
(2) to four (4) weeks (R. 509, P. 243). 
At trial Hansen presented a chart which showed 
Jeschke incurred 52,032.00 in chiropractic services (R. 
396, Para, 22, R. 413). 
Jeschke through his counsel asked the jury, in 
good faith, for a verdict of $4,736.00 based on the above 
plus $680.00 for loss of income for two weeks off work (the 
latter was uncontradicted) (R. 396, Para. 23, R. 413). 
On October 22, 1988, Hansen sent: a letter to 
Ogilvie which requested proposed certain information and 
that certain stipulations be made (R. 414). Ogilvie 
rejected the request in the letter by phone (R. 396, Para. 
25) . 
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At trial, Patrick Luers, M.D. presented visual 
proof via X-rays that Jeschke had not suffered the serious 
type of soft tissue injuries Jeschke1s medical experts 
testified to (R. 509, p. 182-201). Paul France, a 
biophysical expert, ruled out this accident as the cause of 
any serious soft tissue injury in his opinion (R. 509, p. 
207-216). 
None of the evidence referred to in the last 
paragraph was ever disclosed to Hansen or Jeschke before 
trial (R. 391, Para. 27). 
Hansen informed defense counsel he would endeavor 
to settle the case for a "nuisance value11 figure when he 
rejected Ogilvie's settlement offer of S300.00 (R. 397, 
Par. 28 and R. 382). No response was made to Hansen's 
inviting a larger settlement offer. 
Jeschke and Hansen acted in good faith throughout 
the trial of this case (R. 397, Para. 29, R. 403, Para. 2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in finding that Jeschkefs 
action was without merit and he did not file his suit in 
good faith. 
The trial court erred in finding that Hansen 
violated Rule 11 by signing some pleading, motion or other 
paper without reading it or failing to make a reasonable 
inquiry that said document was well grounded in fact and 
law as required by said rule despite the fact that the all 
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of the evidence is that such an inquiry was made and that 
all such documents were well grounded in fact and law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
(a) JESCHKE1S SUIT WAS WITHOUT MERIT, 
AND (b) JESCHKE DID NOT FILE HIS SUIT IN 
GOOD FAITH. 
The jury found that Willis was negligent in the 
operation of the school bus which collided with Jeschkefs 
truck (R. 321). It also found, however, that such 
negligence was not the cause of the injuries Jeschke 
complained of (R. 321). Thomas Soderberg, M.D. and Rrian 
Burns, M.C. testified that in their opinion the injuries in 
question were caused by the subject accident (R. 508, P. 82 
and R. 505, P. 14, respectively). Jeschke is not 
knowledgeable in medical matters or biophysics and had no 
reason to doubt that the opinions of his medical experts 
were not correct (R. 403, 404). When adverse proof 
confronted him he rebutted it with reasons why a jury 
should believe his testimony rather than those of adverse 
witnesses (R. 393, Para. 4-6). 
It is impossible to prove the negative. Only a 
presumption from lack of the affirmative is available to 
him in this appeal since he was denied a notice and 
opportunity to be heard as required by the due process 
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clauses of our state and federal constitutions. Thus 
Jeschke respectfully submits that there is insufficient 
evidence in the record to justify the conclusion as to him 
reached by the trial judge* The judge's subjective opinion 
as to the issue is not legally sufficient to support the 
$10,000.00 judgment herein appealed from. 
To sustain the judgment appealed from will put in 
motion a dangerous precedent which defense counsel are 
certain to capitalize on to "chill" the filing of many law 
suits which are undoubtedly meritorious but which involve 
claimants who are not willing to subject themselves to 
ruinous judgments for sanctions if they should lose their 
case and the judge forms a subjective opinion against them 
for whatever reason. 
In the trial court respondeents relied primarily 
upon Cody v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah, 1983) (R. 383). 
Appellants have no quarrel with that case nor with an 
excellent law review article published in the Utah Law 
Review in 1984 beginning at page 5<?3 entitled "Attorney's 
Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions." It is to be noted 
that in Cody the Utah Supreme Court vacated the award of 
attorney's fees because there was no proof that the suit 
was not brought in good faith. Appellants here likewise 
assert that there is no such proof in this record either. 
Even though the jury found in favor of appellant 
Jeschke on the issue of negligence, the respondents were 
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the prevailing party as the jury found no causation, hence 
the first of three "distinct findings" required by Cody for 
an award pursuant to Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953 was met. 
The second distinct finding per Cody is that the 
trial court would have to find that the action was "without 
merit." The Cody court stated that term was synonymous 
with "frivolous" which was there defined in accordance with 
the dictionary definition as being "of little weight or 
importance, having no basis in law or fact." The court in 
Cody found the plaintiffs1 causes of action there to be 
"without merit." No such finding was made in this case (R. 
427, R. 428). Even if such a finding had been made, it 
would not have been supported by the evidence. On the 
contrary the evidence of liability was so clear to 
Jeschke?s counsel that he filed a motion for summary 
judgment as to the issue (R. 66). Counsel for the school 
bus driver and the school district considered the case 
important enough that he served 52 interrogatories upon 
plaintiff (R. 154), spent eight hours in deposing plaintiff 
(R. 123) and some seven hours in deposing plaintiff's 
principal medical expert (R. 394), Para. 14) and incurring 
expect witness fees of some 510,000.00 (R. 379, Para. 9). 
If it was clear that the case had no merit, appellants 
respectfully submit that the trial court should have 
granted defendants1 motion for a directed verdict and saved 
the time and effort of jury instructions, argument and 
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deliberations. He did not do so but took the motion under 
advisement (R. 509, p. 248-252). To denominate the cause 
of such exhaustive trial preparation as being of "little 
weight or importance" is to torture the meaning of the 
terms just quoted. 
The third required finding is that of bad faith. 
Again the trial court did not make such a finding. At best 
one could be implied from the predicate stated being "The 
motion of the State of Bad Faith Attorneys fees." In any 
event the question of bad faith is a question of fact as 
noted in the law review article cited above and thus 
"should be granted substantial deference on appeal" (P. 
599). 
Accordingly appellants will focus primarily on the 
second essential finding of "without merit" as "the 
'without merit1 determination (is) a question of law, 
therefore it should be fully reviewable by the appeals" 
court." That article cautioned against the Utah courts 
accepting the broader definition "without merit" including 
that which "borders on frivolity" as that "adds greater 
subjectivity to the 'without merit1 determination" and it 
is "more difficult to apply and to review" (84 U.L.R. at p. 
598). 
Appellants will not endeavor here to canvas the 
objective facts upon which the foregoing conclusion of law 
might be grounded since the trial court did not specify any 
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such facts or factors and respondents' counsel was adamant 
that the entire record be provided to establish the basis 
for the sanction judgments over appellants1 objection 
thereto (R. 441-444). 
The record in instant case is in sharp contrast 
with the record in Tokip v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah, 
1987). There the court's decision noted "'The record 
supports the findings of the trial court that defendant 
attempted to avoid liability by testifying falsely." Here 
there was no comparable finding and the strongest case 
against plaintiff's testimony could only be that his 
testimony may not have been well founded due to his 
ignorance of medical matters and his belief that his 
injuries complained of were an aggregation of his prior 
condition. That prior condition was indeed grievous. As 
to that defendants' principal medical expert said: 
Basically, I have no question or no 
quarrel that this young man has 
difficulty, that he has spine problems. 
He can't help but have spine problems. 
I see a minimum of 125 patients a week. 
I operate on over 300 spines a year. 
And so the depth of my clinical 
experience is significant. And if he 
were to walk into my office and simply 
review the X-rays, almost without a 
history, I would be most surprised if he 
didn't have episodes of low back pain, 
if he didn't have difficulty with pain 
between his shoulder blades and into his 
shoulders and if he didn't have 
difficulty with his neck. All of these 
are very well documentable on the x-ray 
studies that he has and so I strongly 
believe this young man does have pain, 
that he is uncomfortable. 
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I strongly believe also that the 
accident did not create this discomfort 
or this disability that he currently has 
(R. 509, p. 230, 231). 
All other cases since Cody which involved the bad 
faith statute do not add to its teachings and are not 
considered helpful on this appeal. 
ARUGMENT 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
HANSEN DID NOT READ A DOCUMENT OR SIGNED 
IT WITHOUT A REASONABLE INQUIRY AS TO 
ITS MERITS IN FACT AND LAW. 
Since Hansen signed numerous documents and none 
are identified in the judgment papers as to him, he is in 
the same position as Jeschke is with respect to objective 
evidence. 
Hansen urges this Court to consider the fact that 
the judgment creditors have not contradicted Hansen!s 
affidavit (R. 392) and that requires a conclusion contrary 
to that of the trial judge as all evidence in the record 
with relates to Rule 11 is in his favor. 
Under Rule 11 of U.R.C.P. the attorney who signs 
the document in question certifies that lfto the best of his 
knowledge, information and belief after reasonable inquiry 
it is well founded in fact and warranted by existing law.11 
Only by violating that certificate is there a basis for 
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sanctions and the measure of the sanctions is "the amount 
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing 
of the pleading, motion or other papers, including 
attorneys fees.11 
In this case the trial court substituted its own 
standard for that of Rule 11. The Court found that counsel 
was liable because he "could or should have sensed the 
nature and lack of merit in the case." If counsel had in 
fact the belief he certified to and that belief was 
mistaken due to his being overly optimistic by nature or by 
reason of being less intelligent than the average, 
sanctions would not be proper. On the other hand, the 
disjunctive alternatives under the trial judge's standard 
could be invoked in virtually every case which results in a 
"no cause of action." Such prospect would have a most 
chilling effect on personal injury litigation. 
There were three documents signed by the 
intervening appellant in this case after August 3, 1988, 
the date mentioned in the trial court's memorandum decision 
(R. 427), to wit: (1) Motion to Bifricate Trial on 
September 16, 1988 (R. 213); (2) Notice of Withdrawal on 
September 28, 1988 (R. 216); and (3) Plaintiff's Requests 
for Voir Dire Questions, Jury Instructions and For a 
Special Verdict on October 4, 1988 (R. 218). As to those 
documents no factual inquiry would be involved by reason of 
their nature. Investigation of the law would be required 
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as to (3) and that was done as certified* No claim has 
been made that any of these certifications violated Rule 
11 . 
Respondents1 counsel did not specify in his Rule 
11 motion for sanctions which certification was the basis 
for sanctions requested under that rule. On the contrary 
he urged the court to base such sanctions on the fact that 
appellant's attorney was put on notice prior to trial that 
plaintiff's claims were unsubstantiated and "most likely 
fraudulent" and yet he proceeded to trial. Rule 11 does 
not by its terms embrace such an expanded risk of 
proceeding at one's peril even after making a reasonable 
inquiry concerning such notice as occurred here (R. 
392-404). 
As of the latest Shepard's report there have been 
only three Utah cases which have involved Rule 11 U.R.C.P. 
to wit: Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481 
(Utah, 1979); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1327 (Utah App. 
1987) ; Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 162 (Utah App. 
1989) and only the later dealt with sanctions. 
As for the Taylor case, it was undisputed that the 
purported will attached to the original complaint 
"contained the signature of only one witness." Since the 
law requires two signatures for a will to be valid a 
reasonable inquiry by counsel would have disclosed that 
plaintiff had no case or that the wrong copy was attached 
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if another copy had two signatures. The Court in that case 
thus concluded that by failing to conduct the inquiry 
mandated by Rule 11 either the client or his attorney or 
both had violated the subject rule. Since the trial court 
imposed sanctions against the client only the Court 
remanded for the determination of whether the attorney 
should bear all, part or none of the $5,000.00 imposed for 
sanctions. 
The Taylor case is clearly distinguishable from 
the one at bar as there has been no claim that plaintifffs 
counsel in this case did not make a reasonable inquiry that 
plaintiff's case was "well grounded in fact and warranted 
by existing law.11 It is also undisputed that after 
defendants1 counsel put plaintiff's counsel on notice that 
plaintiff's claim was "probably fraudulent" that 
plaintiff's counsel did make an inquiry. The issue is 
whether that inquiry was a reasonable one. Intervenor 
appellant respectfully submits it was because it directly 
confronted plaintiff with the facts upon which the fraud 
was based, to with, the prior accident in which the pickup 
truck in question was involved and the dirt bike incident 
(see R. 392, para. 4, 5). 
There is no dispute in the record that the first 
truck damage amounted to some $300.00 whereas the latter 
came to over $900.00 which logically confirms plaintiff's 
claim that the accident in question caused damages not 
involved in the first accident. 
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As for the dirt bike accident the plaintiff 
informed his counsel that he had witnesses to prove that 
there had not been an accident (an injury caused by rough 
riding was acknowledged) and such a witness was produced at 
trial (R. 509, p. 245-247). 
Additionally plaintiff's counsel sought the advice 
of another experienced attorney practicing in this area of 
the law who counselled him that he could properly proceed 
if the client admitted all the negative facts in question, 
with he did (R. 392, para. 7). 
It would set a very dangerous precedent for this 
court to sustain sanctions against an attorney for carrying 
forth his client's cause after a reasonable investigation 
that assured him that his client's cause still had merit 
but in an amount much less than when the case was first 
filed. Cases of small magnitude are not per se frivolous 
if the amounts sustainable in damages justify the expense 
of a trial. Here the amount was indeed marginal but is was 
the "victim" of the alleged abuse here that insisted on 
trial not the "abuser" since the former would offer only 
$300.00 new money to settle. Although offers of settlement 
cannot be used at trial, on appeal the good faith or lack 
of it as gleaned from those offers ought to be of 
assistance in balancing the societal value of courts not 
being saturated with frivolous cases against the right of 
all injured parties to have their day in court even if 
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their damage claims are so modest that they are 
questionable by cost/benefit ratio standards. 
In considering the foregoing balance the 
appellants respectfully request this court to consider the 
fact that a "no cause of action11 judgment per se penalizes 
the losing party and discourages litigation. Respondents1 
counsel claims to have spent over 200 hours on this case 
which he values at being worth $18,000.00 (R. 394). 
Appellantfs counsel spent about half that amount of time 
but at his rate of $100.00 per hour that is a loss of 
$10,000.00. Additionally jury fees were assessed against 
plaintiff/appellant in the sum of $379.00 which will be due 
plus interest at 12% from December 22, 1988 no matter what 
the outcome of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgments appealed from herein should be 
reversed and vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of February, 
Robert B. Hansen 
* W o U ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 26th day of 
February, 1990, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed by undersigned, 
Edward 0. Ogilvie 
Reed M. Stringham 
Assistant Attorney Generals 
236 State Capitol" Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Robert B. Hansen 
*L~ 
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A D D E N D U M 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action 
or defense in bad frith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reason-
able attorney's fees to a prevailizg party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brcught or asserted in 
good faith, except under Subsection (2): 
(2) The court, in its discretion may award no fees 
or limited fees against a party ^nder Subsection (1), 
but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has died an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record tie reason for 
not awarding fees under the provision of Subsec-
tion (1). 1988 
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable in-
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a plead-
ing, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the pleader or mov-
ant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the 
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's tee. 
iAmended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and 
other papers; sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 
one attorney of record in his individual name who is 
duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The 
attorney s address also shall be stated. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shall sign his plead-
ing, motion, or other paper and state his address. Ex-
cept when otherwise specifically provided by rule or 
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
nied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the aver-
ments of an answer under oath must be overcome by 
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sus-
tained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
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Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
EDWARD 0. OGILVIE - 2452 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
SAL; 
By 
QK 
ye COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Q\vAShMA 
FLINT JESCHKE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID T. WILLIS, and GRANITE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendants. 
a-s-^-^A 
JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR BAD FAITH 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No. C87-3852 
Judge David S. Young 
Based upon Defendants' Motion for Bad Faith Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs and matters in support thereof, the record of 
proceedings for the above-captioned case, and the Court's Minute 
Entry of January 20, 1989, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED as follows: 
(1) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, Plaintiff 
Flint Jeschke is hereby ordered to pay $10,000.00 in bad faith 
attorneys' fees to Defendants with judgment so entered in said 
amount; 
(2) Pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Plaintiff's attorney, Robert B. Hansen, having 
proceeded in bad faith, is hereby ordered to pay Defendants 
$2,000.00 with judgment soentered in said amount. 
DATED this CH. day of ^CuhMU^-^ , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
VID S'. 
Third J Disltriprt Court Judge 
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